Wittgenstein on Life, Art, and the &quot;Right Perspective&quot; by Tomasi, Gabriele
Gabriele Tomasi
Wittgenstein on Life, Art, and the  
“Right Perspective”
In this paper I would like to offer an interpretation of a remark Wittgenstein wrote 
in 1930. This text has already appeared in Vermischte Bemerkungen, edited by 
Georg H. von Wright, and has found a new context in the so called Kringel-Buch 
– a collection of remarks by Wittgenstein recently put together with extraordi-
nary philological expertise by Joseph Rothhaupt. Here, it appears as section 52. 
Though to strip the section from its larger context and consider it as a sort of auto-
nomous piece is disputable, I hope this move is excusable on the one hand on the 
ground that the Kringel-Buch as Initialtext or book-project has a relatively loose 
structure and on the other hand, because section 52 – if I am not mistaken, the 
longest in the Kringel-Buch – conveys a sense of completeness.1
The paper is divided into five sections. In the first section, I present the struc-
ture and themes of KB #52. As we shall see, KB #52 mainly deals with the nature of 
a certain way of looking at things – a way that transforms ordinary things, actions 
and events into something significant or wonderful. The remaining sections are 
devoted to the interpretation of the text. In the second section, I comment on the 
thought experiment Wittgenstein suggests to the reader, which consists in imag-
ining a certain scene represented on a theatre stage. This is a crucial passage in 
KB #52, since it introduces the question of the relation between art and value. I 
concentrate on this question in the third section of the paper, while in the fourth 
section, in order to explore the implications of a specific passage in Wittgen-
stein’s text, I suggest a comparison with XVII century Dutch painting and pursue 
the point further by recalling Hegel’s interpretation of this episode in the history 
of western art. I do not mean to suggest that Wittgenstein may have been influ-
enced by Hegel. Wittgenstein was a reader of Schopenhauer and was aware of the 
1 From now on I shall use the abbreviation KB #52 in order to refer to the remark at issue. Abbrevia-
tions for Wittgenstein’s works in the text are as follows: LC = Lectures and Conversations on Aesthet-
ics, Psychology & Religious Belief, ed. by Cyril Barrett, Blackwell, Oxford 1966; LE = “Wittgenstein’s 
Lecture on Ethics”, The Philosophical Review, 74 (1965), pp. 3-12; TB = Tagebücher 1914–1916, in 
Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe, Band 1, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1984, pp. 87–187; TLP 
= Tractatus logico-philosophicus, in Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe, Band 1, Suhrkamp, Frank-
furt am Main 1984, pp. 9–85; WWK = Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis, in Ludwig Wittgenstein 
Werkausgabe, Band 3, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1984. References to LE and WWK are by page 
number; references to LC and TLP are to section number; references to TB are by entry date.
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latter’s conception of art, while he had probably no idea about Hegel’s aesthetics. 
However, I believe that juxtaposing Wittgenstein’s (Schopenhauerian) concep-
tion of art as a way of looking at things with Hegel’s interpretation of XVII century 
Dutch painting could be illuminating, since Hegel’s interpretation is very power-
ful in casting light on how art can give significance to the ordinary. Finally, in the 
fifth and conclusive section I hint at some problems with Wittgenstein’s (early) 
idea that ethics and aesthetics – or art and life – are connected with each other.
1  Structure and themes of KB #52
KB #52 seems to be the record of an actual conversation Wittgenstein had and it 
probably conveys Wittgenstein’s considerations on an issue concerning himself. 
At the same time, it is a piece of philosophical reflection, although a strange one: 
it was written in 1930 but, at times, it sounds as if it came from the past, like a 
fragment from the early Wittgenstein. In particular, it reminds the reader of some 
entries in the Tagebücher or in the Tractatus, because it shows a conception of art 
and artwork that seems reminiscent of the “transcendental” aesthetics typical of 
the early Wittgenstein.2 However, as we shall see, the core of the section is intro-
duced by „Ich sagte wir hätten hier einen Fall ähnlich folgendem […]“, a phrasing 
typical of a later Wittgenstein and in line with his conviction that we can under-
stand a phenomenon by focusing our attention on the resemblance it has with 
other phenomena – a conviction that underlies many among Wittgenstein’s cri-
tical notes on Sir James George Frazer’s The Golden Bough collected in the Krin-
gel-Buch (see, for instance, KB #169). Stylistic features aside, I do not believe KB 
#52 is a sort of relic. Rather, I am inclined to think that it illustrates some points 
that are deeply rooted in Wittgenstein’s outlook, even though his conception of 
aesthetics was undergoing a change at the time he wrote the remark.3
2 In the Tractatus Wittgenstein states that ethics is transcendental and that ethics and aesthetics are 
one (TLP 6.421). Aesthetics too, then, is transcendental. In my interpretation, by qualifying aesthetics 
in this way Wittgenstein means to emphasize that it is connected to the world and, at the same time, 
that its “content” disappears if we try to make it part of the world. In this sense, aesthetics is also 
“transcendent” (cf. TB 30.7.16). Aesthetics is connected to the world in a way similar to that of logic, 
i.e. as a condition of the world (cf. TB 24.7.16). If logic mirrors the formal properties of the world it 
fills (cf. TLP 5.61, 6.12), aesthetics is a point of view on the meaning or value of the world. And, just 
like logic, aesthetics does not have representational content, it is not about a particolar kind of facts. 
According to Wittgenstein, the value of the world must lie outside the world (cf. TLP 6.41).
3 Wittgenstein’s 1938 lecture on aesthetics suggests that he developed a conception of aesthetics 
as grammar, that is, as a kind of conceptual inquiry primarily concerned with the ways practices 
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The text can be divided into two parts. The first part can be regarded as a 
story or a plot. The second part is a sort of theoretical development of the story 
told in the first part. I shall quote from the first part of the text, following its nar-
rative structure. It opens with the account of a conversation between Wittgenstein 
and his friend Paul Engelmann:
Engelmann sagte mir, wenn er <zu Hause> in seiner Lade voll von seinen Manuscripten 
krame so kämen sie ihm so wunderschön vor daß er denke sie wären es wert den anderen 
Menschen gegeben zu werden. (Das sei auch der Fall wenn er Briefe seiner verstorbenen 
Verwandten durchsehe). <Wenn er sich aber eine Auswahl davon herausgegeben denkt so 
verliere die Sache jeden Reiz & Wert & werde unmöglich.>
From a narrative point of view, the opening is the exposition: it provides the 
reader with the elements that will be developed and clarified throughout the rest 
like appreciation, criticism, discussion or other direct forms of involvement with artwork are 
interwoven with language (cf. Johannessen 2004). In the opening remark of the Lectures, Witt-
genstein states that the subject, i.e. Aesthetics, “as far as” he could see, is “entirely misunder-
stood” (LC I 1). It is not easy to specify what misunderstandings Wittgenstein had in mind. How-
ever, among them there was certainly the consideration of aesthetics as a branch of psychology. 
For Wittgenstein, the idea of a science of aesthetics was ridiculous or stupid (cf. LC II 1, 2 e 35). 
I think we can draw a parallel between a central aspect of Wittgenstein’s critique of Frazer’s 
Golden Bough and his critique of the idea that some kind of scientific aesthetics is possible. In 
a nutshell, the core of the criticism towards this idea is that “aesthetic explanation is not causal 
explanation” (LC II 38). Wittgenstein addresses a similar objection against Frazer’s treatment of 
primitive rituals. He claims that Frazer assimilates the understanding of ritual customs to a prob-
lem of scientific explanation and maintains that this is a wrong move, since it brings to represent 
the ritual in question as nonsense (cf. KB #102). The point, for Wittgenstein, is that, when we 
consider primitive rituals, we can gain the satisfaction we seek in an explanation by means either 
of describing a way of acting, arranging in the right way what we already know, or of consider-
ing the relation that links the ritual in question to us. Once a ritual or a custom is brought into 
connection with something that finds an echo in our experience, we get the desired explanation 
(cf. KB #104). Wittgenstein’s point is not only methodological; what he tries to show is that if 
we seek to explain a ritual we mistake the exact nature of what we are supposed to explain (cf. 
De Lara 2003 and Bouveresse 2007). A remark by G. E. Moore, which appears in his account of 
Wittgenstein’s 1930–1933 lectures, documents the connection between Wittgenstein’s remarks on 
the understanding of rituals and the conception of aesthetics he developed through the Thirties. 
Moore writes: “His discussion of Aesthetics […] was mingled in a curious way with criticism of 
assumptions which he said were constantly made by Frazer in the Golden Bough, and also with 
criticism of Freud”. According to Moore’s notes, for Wittgenstein “what Aesthetics tries to do […] 
is to give reasons, e.g. for having this word rather than that in a particular place in a poem, or for 
having this musical phrase rather than that in a particular place in a piece of music. […] Reasons, 
he said, in Aesthetics, are of the nature of further description” (Moore 1955: 16, 19). This sounds 
very similar to what Wittgenstein also maintains for understanding primitive rituals (cf. KB #105).
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of the story. It must be noted that Wittgenstein is not explicit on the nature of 
Engelmann’s manuscripts: evidently, this is not relevant to the story. He limits 
himself to describe the changes in Engelmann’s feelings when he looks at the 
drawer full of his own manuscripts: when he considers them as a whole, he thinks 
they are certainly valuable and worth publishing; if he considers publishing a 
selection from the manuscripts however, “the whole business loses its charm and 
value”. Why is it so? This is the problem that will find a (partial) solution at the 
end of the story.
The story goes on with Wittgenstein’s reply to Engelmann:
Ich sagte wir hätten hier einen Fall ähnlich folgendem: Es könnte nichts merkwürdiger sein 
als einen Menschen bei irgend einer ganz einfachen alltäglichen Tätigkeit wenn er sich 
unbeobachtet glaubt zu sehen.
From a narrative point of view, this is the rising action: the element that builds 
up tension and leads to the climax of the story, which comes immediately after-
wards. Wittgenstein suggests a thought experiment:
Denken wir uns ein Theater, der Vorhang ginge auf & wir sähen einen Menschen allein in 
seinem Zimmer auf & ab gehen, sich eine Zigarette anzünden, sich niedersetzen u.s.f. so 
daß wir plötzlich von außen einen Menschen sähen wie man sich sonst nie sehen kann; 
wenn wir gl quasi ein Kapitel einer Biographie mit eigenen Augen sähen, – das müßte 
unheimlich & wunderbar zugleich sein. Wunderbarer als irgend etwas was ein Dichter auf 
der Bühne spielen oder sprechen lassen könnte. Wir würden das Leben selbst sehen.
Unlike the man who is unaware of being watched, the man on the stage is well 
aware of being watched. However, in a sense the theatrical situation gives struc-
ture to the former case and Wittgenstein focuses his attention on the effect of the 
vision „von außen“ we have in both cases: an ordinary scene becomes extraordi-
nary, remarkable. He thus suggests that the way we look at things can have a sort 
of power of transformation on them. Hinting at the nature of this way of seeing 
with the theatre thought experiment, Wittgenstein collocates the turning point of 
the story, its climax, at the level of our attitude towards things.
The story ends with an answer to an objection:
– Aber das sehen wir ja alle Tage & es macht uns nicht den mindesten Eindruck! Ja, aber wir 
sehen es nicht in der Perspektive.
The conclusion confirms that at the level of our attitude towards objects, a trans-
formation of the value or meaning they have for us can occur. Maybe this does 
not completely dissolve the trouble in Engelmann’s case. Still, when we consider 
Wittgenstein’s interpretation of the story we can see that it explains one of the two 
ways Engelmann feels towards his manuscripts: 
Wittgenstein on Life, Art, and the “Right Perspective”    359
So wenn E. seine Schriften ansieht & sie herrlich /<wunderbar>/ findet (die er doch einzeln 
nicht veröffentlichen möchte) so sieht er sein Leben, als ein Kunstwerk Gottes, & als das ist 
es allerdings betrachtenswert, jedes Leben & Alles.
This passage can be seen as the narrator’s commentary on the story, his medi-
tation on the reported events; it also marks the beginning of the second part of 
the section – the theoretical one. It is a passage packed with ideas. Wittgenstein 
introduces new concepts. As the above lines document, there’s a change in the 
description of the object of Engelmann’s sight. Wittgenstein suddenly shifts from 
considering Engelmann’s attitude towards his own manuscripts to claiming that, 
while looking at the manuscripts in the drawer, his friend was taking a certain atti-
tude towards his life. It is as if, when Engelmann gives value to his manuscripts, 
what he actually finds valuable is his own life. To express this idea, Wittgenstein 
claims that Engelmann could see his life as a work of art created by God. From 
this standpoint, Wittgenstein comments, life is certainly worth contemplating. 
This suggests that looking at one’s life from the outside – as one would look at an 
actor on a theatre stage – is like seeing it as a divine work of art.
Wittgenstein goes on to articulate two general theses: one concerning the 
work of the artist, and the other concerning artworks. It is worth quoting Witt-
genstein at length:
Doch kann nur der Künstler das Einzelne so darstellen daß es uns als Kunstwerk erscheint; 
jene Manuscripte verlieren mit Recht ihren Wert wenn man sie einzeln & überhaupt wenn 
man sie unvoreingenommen, das heißt ohne schon vorher begeistert zu sein, betrachtet. 
Das Kunstwerk zwingt uns – sozusagen – zu der richtigen Perspektive, ohne die Kunst aber 
ist der Gegenstand nur <ein Stück> Natur wie jedes andre & daß wir es durch die Begeiste-
rung erheben können das berechtigt niemand es uns vorzusetzen. (Ich muß immer an eine 
jener faden Naturaufnahmen denken die der, der sie aufgenommen interessant findet weil 
er dort <selbst war,> etwas erlebt hat, der dritte aber mit berechtigter Kälte betrachtet; wenn 
es überhaupt gerechtfertigt ist ein Ding mit Kälte zu betrachten).
As a sort of conclusive comment, Wittgenstein mentions a way of looking at 
things that he considers similar to the one typical of the artist:
Nun scheint uns aber, gibt es außer dem Kü der Arbeit /<Tätigkeit>/ /<Funktion>/ des Künst-
lers noch eine andere, die Welt sub specie äterni einzufangen. Es ist – glaube ich – der Weg 
des Gedankens der gleichsam über die Welt hinfliegt & sie <so> läßt wie sie ist, – sie von 
oben im /<vom>/ Fluge betrachtend. [sie vom Fluge betrachtend] [sie von oben vom Fluge 
betrachtend].
The observation is of some importance for the topic of the text. The presence of 
the expression sub specie aeterni in these last lines of KB #52 brings us back to 
the Tractatus, where the expression is used in relation to the (metaphorical) act of 
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seeing the world as a whole (cf. TLP 6.45), and above all to a well known entry from 
Wittgenstein’s Tagebücher 1914–1916, which I shall quote below. As for now, it is 
interesting to note that while in the previous part of KB #52 Wittgenstein speaks 
of art as directed to particular objects, in the closing lines of the text he mentions 
the world as object of the artist’s work. The shift parallels that in the Engelmann’s 
anecdote, where Wittgenstein first considers his friend’s manuscripts and then 
his life. This last part of the discourse evokes the young Wittgenstein’s thesis that 
life and the world are the same (cf. TLP 5.621).
Before we analyse the text in some detail, let us recall the problem it addresses. 
KB #52 begins by discussing an experience that happened to Paul Engelmann, a 
close friend of Wittgenstein, when he was looking at his manuscripts. He noted a 
sharp difference in the attribution of value to the writing depending on whether 
he looked at all of the manuscripts in a drawer, or considers the hypothesis of pub-
lishing a selection of them. As Engelmann feels that in the latter case his writings 
lose their charm and value, the former case contrasts with the latter. However, 
maybe the feeling that the manuscripts seem to lose their value is not due to the 
fact that Engelmann contemplates them singly, but that he thinks about publish-
ing them. In other words, I suggest that what determines the change in Engel-
mann’s feelings when he considers the hypothesis of publishing a selection from 
his manuscripts is that in this circumstance he withdraws from his detachment.
Since Wittgenstein identifies the whole of Engelmann’s manuscripts with his 
life, if the point were singularity, it would follow that one’s life is worth being 
contemplated only if taken as a whole, while episodes of a life, considered sin-
gularly, have no value. However, this is not plausible, because if we look at an 
episode from the “right perspective”, the episode can become our world or our 
life, according to Wittgenstein. It is just like in the theatre experiment: when we 
observe a fragment of life, we see life itself.
At this point it is worth quoting the above mentioned entry from the Tage-
bücher:
Das Kunstwerk ist der Gegenstand sub specie aeternitatis gesehen; und das gute Leben ist die 
Welt sub specie aeternitatis gesehen. Dies ist der Zusammenhang zwischen Kunst und Ethik.
Die gewöhnliche Betrachtungsweise sieht die Gegenstände gleichsam aus ihrer Mitte, die 
Betrachtungsweise sub specie aeternitatis von außerhalb. (TB 7.10.16)
According to this note, a work of art is a way of seeing an object. The entry from 
the following day suggests that a work of art basically is a way of seeing that strips 
the object from its context – the state of affairs – and makes it the world of the 
observer. Wittgenstein writes: „Als Ding unter Dingen ist jedes Ding gleich unbe-
deutend, als Welt jedes gleichbedeutend“ (TB 8.10.16). I shall come back to this 
entry below. As for now, I would like to point out that Wittgenstein’s words seem 
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to confirm that what is relevant in Engelmann’s case is the change in attitude. 
If this is correct, then also the selection of Engelmann’s writings could be seen, 
at least in principle, in its singularity, as a work of art, i.e. as something worth 
contemplating. This obviously does not mean that, in virtue of the way it would 
be looked at, it would be transformed into a valuable piece of literature. Suppose 
the selection is a collection of poetry of little artistic value. When it is seen as a 
work of art, its poor artistic value does not change. Nevertheless, it receives value 
in virtue of how it is seen, i.e. because of the fact that it is seen from the outside, 
as one’s world or life.
In the closing lines of KB #52, Wittgenstein metaphorically describes the „Weg 
des Gedankens“ as a way of looking at the world from above, as if thought could fly 
above the world. This is an image that suggests a sense of detachment. Moreover, 
according to the entry I have just quoted, this is the way of seeing that character-
izes a good, happy life. This may sound rather odd. After all, when observed from 
the outside, our life does not look like ours; moreover, such a view “from above” 
seems to strip life of its (human) character. It is hard to think that this is the very 
point of view from which our life should look special to us.4 But this is what Witt-
genstein seems to suggest, and he sees a connection between detachment and 
happiness (cf. e.g. TB 13.8.16). However, this point is not emphasized in KB #52; 
rather, the point of the text is the description of a way of seeing that allows for 
appreciating ordinary life, the commonplace. The everyday – a man walking up 
and down, lighting a cigarette, etc. – turns out to be of aesthetic value, if looked at 
in the “right perspective” or sub specie aeternitatis. Whatever else this expression 
means, it seems to suggest that we behold the object – what Wittgenstein calls “a 
chapter from a biography” – as if it had nothing to do with us. Art exemplifies the 
nature of this way of seeing. Wittgenstein, as we have seen, speaks of Engelmann 
seeing his life “as a work of art created by God” and therefore as “worth contem-
plating”. Moreover, he suggests that “every life & everything whatever” is worth 
contemplating. Art is the topic of the theoretical part of the section. But it is in 
the first part of the section, with the narration of Engelmann’s anecdote and the 
proposal of the theatre thought experiment that Wittgenstein seeks to evoke the 
nature of the way of seeing that art exemplifies. Let us now analyse this part of the 
text in more detail, beginning from the transformative action, i.e. from Wittgen-
stein’s suggestion to imagine a scene represented on a theatre stage.
4 For a different reading see Landau 2011.
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2  Theatre and life
The thought experiment Wittgenstein engages the reader in is rather intriguing. 
He does not ask us to imagine watching the sequence of a play; apparently he 
wants us merely to imagine the theatrical framing of an ordinary activity. Hence, 
what he asks us to imagine would essentially be a “theatre” in the very Greek 
meaning of the word, i. e. a “theatron”, a “place for seeing”. In a sense, the theatre 
situation formalizes the scene Wittgenstein evokes in his reply to Engelmann, 
where someone is looking at someone else who is unaware of being watched. 
There is a degree of voyeurism in the situation Wittgenstein wants us to imagine. 
However, in this case, to see and not to be seen seems to be a necessary condition 
for the vision „von außen“ to take place. If the person who is being watched were 
aware of being watched, then the viewer would enter the scene, and one could 
not speak of a vision “from outside”. That the point of Wittgenstein’s voyeurism is 
not an interest in truth of expression as, for example, in traditional approaches to 
photography, is made clear by his comment on the theatre experiment. But before 
getting to this, let us consider a complication in the thought experiment.
The text does not exclude that what Wittgenstein is asking us to imagine 
is not the mere theatrical framing of an ordinary activity, but ourselves watch-
ing an actor performing. For example, “someone alone in his room walking up 
and down, lighting a cigarette, seating himself etc.”. The meaning of this inter-
pretation becomes clear if we consider the artistry involved in this performance 
together with Wittgenstein’s idea that art compels us to see an object in the right 
perspective – an idea I shall examine below.5 It is not difficult to imagine that a 
variety of skills are required in order for us to observe, in Wittgenstein’s words, 
“a human being”: not an illusion of reality, or a pretence, but a full-blooded 
presence, and a presence regarded “from outside in a way that ordinarily we can 
never observe ourselves”.6
5 If we were looking at an actor’s performance, then that we were able to see a human being 
“from the outside”, would be part of the effect of art. Michael Fried recalls that according to 
Diderot, actors should use all the skills at their command “in order to create the dramatic stage 
tableaux that will secure the overarching illusion that the audience has not been taken into ac-
count” (Fried 2008: 27). Since absorption goes hand in hand with unawareness of being beheld, 
we can understand why Fried sees Wittgenstein’s thought experiment as belonging to the cast of 
mind he calls “antitheatrical” (cf. ivi, 77).
6 The theatre thought experiment suggests that Wittgenstein, in line with the beliefs of modern-
ist theatre, assumes that the actor must not be perceived as be acting, whereas he must be the 
character onstage. This is indirectly confirmed by a recollection by John King, a former student of 
Wittgenstein’s. King writes: Wittgenstein “never would go to any British film; and if we passed a 
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What we observe in this case, then, is a fragment of life, “a chapter from a 
biography” or “life itself”. And we observe it as if we were external spectators, 
as if we were not taking part in it. This has aesthetic consequences. Wittgenstein 
comments that the sight of an utterly ordinary activity from this perspective 
is more wonderful than any story a playwright could arrange to be acted on a 
stage. Wittgenstein is thus suggesting that (and how) the everyday can become a 
domain for the aesthetic.
As we have seen, he anticipates an objection that might be raised against this 
idea: life – one might say – is something we see every day, but it does not impress 
us much. Every day we see other human beings busy performing some action, we 
come upon someone absorbed in their activity who, at least for a few moments, 
is unaware of being observed, but we are not in the least impressed by what we 
see. However – Wittgenstein’s reply goes – this is not equivalent to looking at a 
scene from a detached point of view, objectively, so to speak. Detachment makes 
the difference. If seen with detachment – Wittgenstein maintains – an ordinary 
scene looks at the same time unheimlich and wunderbar.
This merits some comment. As for the former, it is quite obvious to think of 
the Freudian Unheimliches. According to Freud, what is unheimlich belongs to 
the class of the frightening, which leads us back to what is known of old and 
has been familiar to us for a long time.7 Wittgenstein, though, uses the term to 
refer to a rather different situation. Nevertheless, Freud’s choice to trace back 
the unheimlich to something familiar is consonant with Wittgenstein’s use of the 
term. What we find uncanny is something that, in a sense, we know well: it is life 
itself. The point is that it loses its familiar character by virtue of the perspective 
from which we look at it: our perspective on it is separate from that of the person 
being observed, as if we were inhabiting different worlds, or better, as if we were 
seeing life from the outside. To see life in this way is to see it sub specie aeternita-
tis, and this is the reason why what we see is not only uncanny, but is “at once” 
wonderful. In an entry from his Tagebücher 1914–1916 Wittgenstein writes: „Das 
künstlerische Wunder ist, daß es die Welt gibt. Daß es das gibt, was es gibt“. (TB 
20.10.16) In a sense, nothing is more familiar to us than the existence of the world. 
Nevertheless, that the world is, may be seen as a wonder. It is interesting that just 
at this juncture of KB #52, art and the artist enter the scene.
cinema advertising one he pointed out how the actor looked dressed-up, unnatural, unconvinc-
ing, obviously play-acting, while, in comparison, in the American films the actors were the part, 
with no pretence” (“Recollections of Wittgenstein” in Rhees 1984: 71 quoted in Fried 2008: 365).
7 Cf. Freud 2005. 
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3  The transfiguring power of art
In what I have called the “resolution” of the narrative portion of KB #52, Witt-
genstein, going back to Engelmann’s anecdote, introduces the concept of art. He 
claims that when Engelmann looks at what he has written and finds it marvel-
lous, he is seeing his life as God’s work of art and, as such, as certainly worth 
contemplating. It seems that Wittgenstein here draws a parallel between Aesthe-
tics and Ethics that recalls the one drawn in the above quoted 7.10.16 entry from 
the Tagebücher. However, we must observe that by speaking of life as a work of 
art created by God he also stresses the fact that – as Carolyn Wilde writes – “one 
does not produce one’s life as one produces a work of art”.8 Engelmann did not 
create his life in the same way he produced his manuscripts, nevertheless he can 
look at his life as if it were a work of art, provided that he sees it from a certain 
point of view. What follows in the text suggests that this point of view is that of 
the artist: “only the artist – Wittgenstein writes – can so represent the individual 
thing (das Einzelne) so that it appears to us as a work of art”.9 With regards to 
life, the exercise of artistry consists in the adoption of a peculiar perspective on 
it – the view sub specie aeternitatis – as opposed to the idea of shaping it as if it 
were a work of art.
If it is seen in this way, life – any kind of life, Wittgenstein seems to be saying 
– can be seen as a work of art created by God, that is, as valuable. This suggests 
that for Wittgenstein the value of a life does not depend on its content, so to 
speak, but on its form. What makes the difference is how life is seen, that is, how 
it is accepted.
It is interesting that Wittgenstein not only attributes to the artist the ability to 
“represent the individual thing so that it appears to us as a work of art”; further-
more, he claims that a work of art compels us to see things in the right perspec-
tive. The terms “art” and “work of art” are used interchangeably. Just like in the 
Tagebücher, in KB #52 Wittgenstein seems to conceive of art as a way of looking 
at things, and therefore to identify art with an attitude, more than an activity. If 
this is correct, it follows that what issues from an act of art-making is a change in 
the way we look at things. That as a result of that act, new objects are produced 
8 Wilde 2004: 174.
9 This recalls Schopenhauer’s description of the work of the genius in section 36 of book III of 
The World. However, as Wilhelm Vossenkuhl has pointed out to me, Kant had already depicted 
the artist, the genius, as someone who has the capacity to make an object appear (when, like the 
ideas of reason, it does not belong to the realm of experience), or appear under a new light (when 
it belongs to the realm of experience) (cfr. Critique of Judgment, sec. 49).
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is secondary. First and foremost, the artist provides a way of viewing that turns 
things into works of art. To better articulate the point, let us look at how the work 
of the artist is characterized in the text.
3.1  Art and value
Wittgenstein maintains that a work of art compels us to see an object in the right 
perspective, while “without art, the object is a piece of nature like any other”. It 
is a Tractarian idea that any piece of the world merely considered as such is just 
an element of the how of the world, of the accidental „Geschehen und So-sein“, 
while value is non-accidental (TLP 6.41). Now, Wittgenstein is suggesting that art 
can turn an object that is a mere “piece of nature” into an object that is worth 
contemplating. This sounds like a theoretical translation of the thought experi-
ment of framing an ordinary action within the box of a theatre stage. This idea 
of transformation is well illustrated by the following entry from the Tagebücher:
Als Ding unter Dingen ist jedes Ding gleich unbedeutend, als Welt jedes gleichbedeutend.
Habe ich den Ofen kontempliert, und es wird mir nun gesagt: jetzt kennst du aber nur den 
Ofen, so scheint mein Resultat allerdings kleinlich. Denn das stellt es so dar, als hätte ich 
den Ofen unter den vielen, vielen Dingen der Welt studiert. Habe ich aber den Ofen kontem-
pliert, so war er meine Welt, und alles Andere dagegen blaß. (TB, 8.10.16)
The entry develops the content of another entry quoted above, where Wittgen-
stein claims that the work of art is the object seen sub specie aeternitatis. There 
he explained that to view objects sub specie aeternitatis is to see them from the 
outside, „So daß sie die ganze Welt als Hintergrund haben“; and he closed the 
entry by adding: „(Es drängt sich der Gedanken auf): Das Ding sub specie aeterni-
tatis gesehen ist das Ding mit den ganzen logischen Raum gesehen“ (TB 7.10.16).
Michael Morris comments that to see something in this way means seeing it 
“with a consciousness […] of the way in which” it “can be combined with other 
things”.10 Combinations of objects are facts, and facts in logical space are the 
world. When the stove is contemplated together with the whole logical space, 
or as being capable of shaping the logical space, it becomes the world of the 
observer. According to Wittgenstein, this is what makes it significant. We can 
hypothesize that, if Englemann were to look at a fragment from his manuscripts 
10 Morris 2008: 326.
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in this way, contemplating it as such, then the fragment would appear significant 
to him, because it would be his world, that is, his life.11
The above mentioned stove example looks like Wittgenstein’s version of a 
thought by Schopenhauer. In The World as Will and Representation (18181, 18442) 
Schopenhauer writes:
Art […] plucks the object of its contemplation from the stream of the world’s course, and 
holds it isolated before it. This particolar thing, which in the stream was an infinitesimal 
part, becomes for art a representative of the whole […]. (Schopenhauer 1969, Book III, sec. 
36, vol. I, 185)
Wittgenstein too can be said to think that art makes us perceive objects as if 
they were representative of the whole world. In his words, this means looking 
at objects together with the whole logical space. In the entry where the work of 
art is defined as the object seen sub specie aeternitatis, he contrasts this way of 
seeing with another he calls „die gewöhnliche Betrachtungsweise“. The latter, 
Wittgenstein writes, „sieht die Gegenstände gleichsam aus ihrer Mitte“, consi-
ders the objects that are being seen as well as the relationship they have with 
other objects, it considers the facts being one specific way rather than another. 
By transforming an object into the world of the beholder, art brings to the fore 
not how the world is but that it is. According to Wittgenstein, aesthetically, the 
miracle is that there is what there is (cf. TB 20.10.16). In order to attempt to make 
sense of this idea, it is worth recalling that the experience that something is, does 
not properly count as an experience (cf. TLP 5.552). It is not a fact, and therefore it 
is not part of the (describable) content of experience. That Wittgenstein calls the 
being there of what there is “aesthetically, the miracle” suggests that art exem-
plifies the form of contemplation of the world that the Tractatus connects to the 
mystical feeling (cf. TLP 6.45).
As we have seen, Wittgenstein parallels art and ethics as forms of the vision 
sub specie aeternitatis. Since, according to Wittgenstein, the world seen in this 
way is the good life (cf. TB 7.10.16), it is quite obvious to assume that “work of art” 
is the expression of what – borrowing an expression by Michael Fried – we could 
call “good objecthood”.12 A good life, is a life that has ethical or absolute value; 
a work of art is an object that has the same kind of value, that is, absolute value. 
If we recall that in the Lecture on Ethics Wittgenstein, to express what he means 
11 The source of Engelmann’s problem does not consist in the fact that he singles out a part from 
the whole of his manuscripts, but in the fact that he thinks about publishing that part. When this 
happens, he ceases to have a vision „von außen“. This is the reason why the manuscripts lose the 
value they appeared to have for him.
12 Fried 2008: 303.
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by “absolute value”, mentions the experience of wondering at the existence of 
the world (cf. LE, 8), we may get a glance of the reason why art confers value on 
things.13 The idea is that by compelling us to see objects in the right perspective, 
art makes us capable of wondering at the existence of what there is and arouses 
in us a feeling about of the value of what there is.
This brings us back to the theatre thought experiment that plays a key-role 
in Wittgenstein’s reflection. When the curtain goes up, a scene opens up for our 
view: we see a space where something comes to presence or, better perhaps, 
where presence (or presentness) is felt more intensely. Sense and value, it seems, 
are packed together in this experience. I would like to elaborate on this point 
a little more by recalling a moment in western painterly tradition, XVII century 
Dutch painting, and the way it has been interpreted by Hegel – a philosopher 
whose way of thinking is very different from Wittgenstein’s.
4  Dutch painting and the everyday
In what Wittgenstein considers the artistic way of looking at things there is, I 
believe, something very similar to the attitude towards the world that we find in 
XVII century Dutch painting, where the most commonplace scenes are depicted 
with the greatest accuracy and skill, so that they look stunning and beautiful. Con-
sider paintings such as The Courtyard of a House in Delft (1658) by Pieter De Hooch, 
Woman Reading (late 1660s) by Pieter Janssens Elinga, Woman peeling apples by 
Gerard Ter Borch (ca. 1660), or Johannes Vermeer’s The Lacemaker (1669–70). The 
way these works of art are painted expresses the acknowledgment that even the 
least interesting objects can also be seen – and depicted – as immensely valuable. 
Without getting into interpretative details, we can acknowledge a sort of implicit 
Spinozism in these paintings, for two reasons. In the first place, they show how 
even extremely ordinary scenes can be seen to embody the perfection of the world. 
There is a difference, though. As Tzvetan Todorov notices, while Spinoza claimed 
that reality in itself is perfect, it is actually the gaze of the painter that by means 
of selecting an object or a scene from the world and transforming it, put us in 
contact with beauty.14 Paintings like the ones mentioned above show that beauty 
13 While in the Lecture Wittgenstein stresses the altogether personal character of his connection 
between the experience of wondering at the existence of the world and the notion of absolute 
value, in his talk with Waismann he seems to give it a more extended significance (cf. Wais-
mann’s records of his December 17th 1930 conversation with Wittgenstein, in WWK, 118). 
14 Todorov 2000: 88.
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can be found in the most meaningless objects, in the most obvious gesture. But 
what makes it appear is the quality of the (artist’s) gaze. In the second place, there 
is a sense of suspension of time in De Hooch as well as in Ter Borch and Vermeer 
that suggests a Spinozian vision sub specie aeterni, so that the transient is captu-
red and becomes eternal. The depicted scenes are taken from ordinary life – a lady 
writing a letter, a woman peeling apples, people drinking in a courtyard, etc. – , 
but they look as if they did not belong to it anymore. Once again, this is the effect 
of the painter’s gaze, a gaze full of grace that rejoices in the existence of things, 
that transforms life illuminating it with meaning and beauty.15 It is, I believe, the 
same grace Wittgenstein evokes while speaking of art as of a way of looking at 
things sub specie aeterni or with a happy eye. The philosopher’s stove example is, 
at least in spirit, near to the Dutch painterly experience that beauty can be found 
in the most common and humble objects.16
The artistic way of seeing is by no means an easy attitude to take. In KB #52, 
Wittgenstein maintains that art forces us into the right perspective17 and, pre-
sumably to avoid misunderstandings, he opposes the artistic way of viewing to 
a way of viewing that we could call “the perspective of the enthusiastic”: while 
art can compel us to wonder at something, “we may exalt an object through our 
enthusiasm but – Wittgenstein writes – that does not give anyone else the right 
to confront us with it”. He explains the point with an example that is worth com-
menting on before going back to the analogy between Wittgenstein’s conception 
of art and XVII century Dutch painting. In brackets Wittgenstein observes that he 
is “always reminded of one of those insipid snapshots of a piece of scenery which 
is of interest for the man who took it because he was there himself and experi-
enced something; but someone else will look at it with justifiable coldness, in so 
far – he adds – it is ever justifiable to look at something with coldness”.
15 Cf. ivi, 116.
16 As a reader of Schopenhauer, Wittgenstein could have had in mind a passage from section 
38 of book III of the World, where Schopenhauer hints at Dutch painting. Further, he may have 
found in the following passage an attitude similar to the one exemplified by Dutch painting: 
“Every state or condition, every person, every scene of life, needs to be apprehended only pure 
objectively, and made the object of a description or sketch, whether with brush or with words, in 
order to appear interesting, delightful, and enviable” (Schopenhauer 1969, Suppl., Book III, cap. 
30, vol. II, 372). According to Schopenhauer, to objectively grasp something means understand-
ing it not as a particular object or event, but as an idea, an eternal form. Wittgenstein’s version of 
the idea is a way of looking at things so that they appear meaningful in themselves just for their 
existence, for being what there is, that is, my world, the world of the beholder.
17 How art can “force” us is an interesting question that I cannot pursue here. However, I will say 
something on this later in sect. 4.2.
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4.1  The snapshot case 
Sometimes things acquire value for idiosyncratic reasons. To me the dried flower 
that I placed in a book is not just a piece of nature. It is, instead, an object of 
great value because it reminds me of a distant summer in the mountains, of the 
friends I was with, and of the beauty of the place. However, looking at the flower 
as if it were something of great value is an entirely personal experience. There is 
no way to force someone else to look at that flower with enthusiasm, and there is 
no way someone can force me to look at it with enthusiasm. Suppose that I took 
some photographs of the mountains in that summer and that I am enthusiastic 
about them, whereas you cannot find anything interesting in them. This case is 
similar to the one Wittgenstein mentions. Often, the photos we take look insipid 
to others; they are interesting to us, because they are connected to an experience 
we had and find valuable in some way.
At the end of the above quoted passage, Wittgenstein is clear about the fact 
that we have no reason to show ordinary objects to other people and expect them 
to find those objects valuable. However, as Michael Fried points out, looking at 
something “with coldness (mit Kälte)” emerges from Wittgenstein’s words “as 
a (perhaps inevitable) failure of humanity”.18 If coldness is a failure, coolness 
could be an ideal. Fried quotes the following entry from Culture and Value:
Mein Ideal ist eine gewisse Kühle. Ein Tempel, der den Leidenschaften als Umgebung dient, 
ohne in sie hineinzureden. (ca. 1929) (VB, 453)
The distinction between looking at something “with coldness” and looking 
at something “with coolness” is as ethical as it is aesthetic. It may hint at the 
(Kantian) ideal of the judgment of taste, or of a disinterested and distanced con-
templation. Reference to this ideal may be implied by the passage in KB #52 we are 
commenting on. Speaking of an insipid snapshot of a scene that is of interest only 
to the man who took it, Wittgenstein implies that it would be possible to take a 
different, more interesting, “artistic” photograph of the same scene.19 The way he 
builds up the opposition between the artistic and the enthusiastic way of viewing 
suggests that we must distinguish between the personal character of the artistic 
way of looking at things and those ways of looking at things, which depend on 
the feelings and interests of the viewers. The latter is a case of looking at things 
„aus ihrer Mitte“, from the perspective of our psychological self, instead that „von 
außen“. According to Wittgenstein, this is not the artistic way of seeing. The arti-
18 Fried 2008: 78.
19 I owe this point to Wilde 2004: 172.
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stic point of view is a detached one, it is the point of view of a subject who is not 
„ein Teil der Welt“, since it shrank to the „Grenze der Welt“ (TLP 5.641).20 As it is 
clear that the difference between an artistic photograph and an insipid snapshot 
does not depend on the nature of the object that is photographed, presumably an 
artistic photograph, according to Wittgenstein’s conception, should embody the 
point of view „von außen“. It should be a photograph taken in such a way that it 
allows to focus one’s attention on what it shows, so that the represented subject 
appears meaningful in itself, and not because it is associated with the viewer. 
Maybe such a photograph should allow for a way of seeing that transcends the 
limits of individual perspective in the sense intended by contemporary aesthetics 
of impassiveness. Works by Clare Richardson from the series Sylvan (2002), or the 
industrial structures photographed by Bernd and Hilla Becher may be examples 
of (Wittgensteinian) artistic photographs. However, the best example is proba-
bly provided by Jeff Wall’s Morning cleaning (1999). It is not without reason that 
Michael Fried conjoins it to KB #52 in a revelatory and suggestive way.
Morning cleaning, a transparency in lightbox, depicts a window cleaner as 
he manipulates a long-handled squeegee inside the (reconstructed) Pavillon that 
Mies van der Rohe, together with Lily Reich, built for the German section of the 
Exposición Internacional in Barcelona in 1929. The work renders the merger of 
interior and exterior spaces by means of the transparent and translucent walls 
that characterize the Pavillon but, despite the richness and elegance of the build-
ing, “the principal focus of the work” is the window-cleaner,21 that is, a man (who 
appears) unaware of being watched, while he is performing an ordinary activity, 
just like the man in Wittgenstein’s thought experiment. 
Actually, in Morning cleaning there is something that reminds one of the kind 
of gaze on ordinary scenes Wittgenstein evokes in KB #52, and I think it is not 
wrong to maintain that a work of art like this comes close to realizing (the young) 
Wittgenstein’s ideal of art.22 Fried links Morning cleaning to the “absorptive mode” 
exemplified by painters like Chardin, in which figures are immersed in their own 
world and activities and display no awareness of the construct of the picture and 
the necessary presence of the viewer.23 But there is also a Dutch-painting char-
20 According to Schopenhauer, the artist is like a clear mirror of the object; s/he is no longer an 
individual among others in the world, whereas s/he becomes the pure subject of knowledge (cf. 
Schopenhauer 1969, Book III, sec. 34, vol. I, 178–179).
21 Fried 2008: 67.
22 Cf. the analysis of the work in Fried 2008: 63–93 and the critical commentary by Mulhall 2011: 
95–98.
23 According to Fried, “starting in the mid-1750s in France a new conception of painting came to 
the fore that required that personages depicted in a canvas appear genuinely absorbed in what-
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acter to it. Although the van der Rohe’s Pavillon does not qualify as a domestic 
setting, Morning Cleaning recalls the scenes of ordinary people engaged in eve-
ryday activities in domestic interiors that we find in XVII century Dutch paint-
ing. Fried himself stresses the affinity between Wall’s picture and a painting such 
as Interior with Painter, Reading Woman, and Sweeping Maid (1665–70) by the 
Dutch painter Pieter Janssens Elinga. Like the Dutch painters, Wall discovers that 
the everyday, the commonplace, can be a domain of the aesthetic. Revealingly, 
Wall tells Jan Tumlir: “the everyday is a space in which meanings accumulate, 
but it’s the pictorial realization that carries the meanings into the realm of the 
pleasurable”.24 As we have seen, in KB #52 Wittgenstein makes a similar point: 
only a work of art, compelling us to see life in the right perspective, can make it 
available for aesthetic contemplation and lets us perceive value in it. This last 
observation brings us back to the analogy between Wittgenstein’s conception of 
art and XVII century Dutch painting I have suggested above. Paintings belonging 
to that period of western art history embody the possibility of illuminating life 
with meaning and beauty, quite like the happy eye of the Wittgensteinian artist. 
I shall now further comment on this point, recalling some passages from Hegel 
that have partially inspired my proposal.
4.2  Hegel’s Dutch painters
I shall not go into details about Hegel’s interpretation of Dutch painting – which 
can be found above all in his Aesthetics, i.e. in the account of Hegel’s lectures 
on fine arts offered by H. G. Hotho – since it may suffice to recall some of its 
elements. The first thing to consider is that Hegel discusses XVII century Dutch 
painting in the context of his account of the romantic form of art. According to 
Hegel, the domain of romantic art is existent humanity, and the principle of the 
romantic form of art is Innerlichkeit, i.e. inwardness, and, more precisely, Innig-
keit, intimacy.25 As Benjamin Rutter points out, Innigkeit is a term that indicates 
ever they were doing, thinking, and feeling, which also meant that they had to appear wholly 
unaware of everything other than the objects of their absorption, including – and this was the 
crucial point – the beholder standing before the painting”. Any suggestion that a painted person-
age was acting for an audience “was considered theatrical in the pejorative sense of the term” 
and was regarded as a fault. Fried recalls that the double stress on absorption and anti-theatri-
cality received a theoretical articulation in Diderot’s writings on drama and painting (Fried 2008: 
26 and for an extensive discussion of the topic Fried 1986).
24 The interview is quoted in Fried 2008: 64.
25 Hegel 1975: 80–81, 801, 812.
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the standpoint of feeling, of an affective mode of access to the world. This notion 
constitutes the structuring principle of Hegel’s taxonomy of the forms of romantic 
painting, each of which “is defined by the class of objects to which it grants the 
viewer intimacy”.26 Dutch painting belongs to the third kind of romantic pain-
ting, the first one being religious painting, and the second landscape. While, 
according to Hegel, religious painting makes it possible to establish a felt relation 
“with the central figures of Christian ethical life”, and landscape “expands the 
realm of intimacy” to what is “plainly external”, therefore allowing us to “posses 
in nature a spiritual depth of our own”, genre painting attempts to endow “a 
trivial content with significant human feeling” instead.27
For Hegel, it is a principle of the modern man, of the “free subjective indi-
vidual”, that he proves himself “in his own eyes to be concrete and living” only by 
his “involvement with concrete reality”28. Dutch painters show this attitude since 
they take “delight […] in what is there”29, and in this way what they allow is inti-
macy with the finitude of human beings. However, in the interpretation of Dutch 
genre painting, Hegel must face an intriguing problem. The objects of this kind 
of painting are often trivial and insignificant, they belong to what he calls “the 
prose of the world”,30 where people are frequently means to others and depend 
upon external forces and purposes. As Rutter observes, “it is artistically impossi-
ble to invest such subjects with the thoroughgoing harmony of content and form” 
required by Hegel’s strict definition of beauty.31 The finitude of everyday life is 
not suited to the ideal. In a sense, Dutch painters renounce beauty by making 
the prose of life the content of their works. They depict liveliness, soulfulness; 
the challenge they take up is to present “the life and joy of independent exist-
ence in general which persists amid the greatest variety of individual aims and 
interests”32.
Dutch artists succeeded in creating this appearance of liveliness because 
they were able to imbue scenes of daily life with a sense of necessity, of a “living 
fit between the feeling and the scene”.33 For Hegel, in these paintings “something 
ephemeral is held fast and made stationary. […] This is – he further comments – 
26 Rutter 2010: 74–75.
27 Ivi, 75–76. Rutter here is referring to Hegel 1975: 814–837. On Hegel on painting cf. also Houl-
gate 2000: 61–82.
28 Hegel 1975: 803.
29 Ivi, 573.
30 Ivi, 150.
31 Rutter 2010: 90 and Hegel 1975: 149. On Hegel’s conception of beauty cf. ivi, 85–90.
32 Hegel 1975: 833.
33 Rutter 2010: 93–94.
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the triumph of art over transience”34. It is interesting that, according to Hegel’s 
interpretation, Dutch artists could achieve such an effect, because they chose 
as the subject of their art the intimacy with the immediate present that results 
from one’s engagement in daily tasks.35 Very often in Dutch paintings the subjects 
seem to exist for the particular task they are carrying out, as if they were devoted 
to it, as if they had put their whole selves into it. It is not without reason that, in 
regard to this, Rutter recalls Fried’s notion of “absorption”. According to Hegel, it 
is this intertwining of the individuals and the tasks they are performing that pro-
duces the harmony in which lies the attraction of Dutch painting. Rutter notices 
that the painter can overcome our resistance to recognize ourselves in the trivial 
scenes genre painting so often presented to us, by shifting our attention “from 
the particularity of the scene at hand, to its quality of absorption, of commitment 
to the form of life at hand”. And the painter can succeed in doing this not only 
because the depicted subjects are themselves absorbed in their actions, but also 
“by absorbing himself in their lives”.36
The notion of the artist’s concentration and commitment to “the world and 
its daily life” is crucial. The painter’s attentiveness and interest in the scene in 
question suggest the scene may deserve the beholder’s attention. Rutter, quoting 
Hotho’s Hegel, states: the painter is thus able to “make significant even what is 
in itself without significance”.37 It is the artist’s own activity that confers value to 
works that cannot be – in Hegel’s sense – beautiful, since they depict the prosaic 
content of daily life. More radically, it is the artist’s activity that can make sig-
34 Quoted in Rutter 2010: 93 from Hegel 1998: Ms. 186.
35 Cf. Rutter 2010: 94.
36 Ivi, 97. Rutter quotes the passage in Hegel’s Aesthetics where we read that “the final achieve-
ment of German and Flamish art is its utterly living absorption in the world and its daily life” 
(Hegel 1975: 884). Hegel speaks of “the subjective vivacity with which the artist, with his own 
spirit and heart, breathes life entirely into the existence of such [prosaic] topics […] and presents 
them to our vision in this animation” (ivi, 596). By qualifying as “subjective” the liveliness of 
the scene, Hegel makes it clear that such liveliness is conferred by the artist. As we also read in 
Aesthetics, “[…] something new is […] added to these commonplace subjects, namely the love, 
the mind and spirit, the soul, with which the artist seizes on them, makes them his own, and so 
breathes his own inspiration of production as a new life into what he creates” (ivi, 837). Inciden-
tally, it is worth noticing that in this way Hegel somehow offers an indirect account of how the 
absorption of ordinary people in their common tasks is not simply imitated, but presented in its 
liveliness by Dutch painting.
37 Ivi, 98 (Hegel 1975: 596). This is not to ignore that daily life can be banal – not to say desper-
ate and nonsensical, as many paintings show us. While acknowledging that the content of genre 
painting has an empirical justification in Dutch history, Hegel wants to clarify the role of the 
painter’s talent in the redemption of the everyday. See also Todorov 2000: 88–89.
374   Gabriele Tomasi
nificant what is in itself insignificant. By painting individuals doing the most 
mundane tasks with meticulousness, commitment and intensity, the artist “forces 
us to see the painted subjects as absorbed”, as if their individuality existed pre-
cisely for the particular tasks in which they are engaged.38
This idea that what matters is the artist’s “way of seeing, his manner of treat-
ment and elaboration, his living absorption”39 in the execution of the work, is 
strikingly similar to Wittgenstein’s conception of the artistic way of looking at 
things and to his idea that art can force us to assume a certain perspective. As 
in (Hegel’s interpretation of) Dutch painting also for Wittgenstein it is the art-
ist’s way of seeing which makes the trivial significant. However, for both philoso-
phers, by achieving this transformation, the artist does not create something new; 
rather, s/he discovers significance, s/he suggests the perspective from which sig-
nificance is revealed to our eyes. In this way, the artist makes life itself available 
for aesthetic contemplation. In Wall’s words, the artist “carries into the realm of 
the pleasurable” the meaning accumulated in the everyday.
5  Art and Life
Let me sum up briefly. In KB #52, with the theatre thought experiment – with 
curtains opening on a scene where an individual performs an utterly ordinary 
activity – Wittgenstein seeks to evoke a particular way of looking at things that 
allows one to take delight not in the fact that things are a certain way rather than 
another, but instead, in the simple fact that there are things. This way of seeing 
things allows to take delight in there being what there is, because it allows us to 
see it as a miracle. Wittgenstein thinks art exemplifies this way of seeing. I have 
suggested that XVII century Dutch painting – and, following Michael Fried, Jeff 
Wall’s photographs – may approximate Wittgenstein’s conception of the artistic 
38 Ivi, 100. In their works of art, Dutch painters link “supreme freedom of artistic composition, 
fine feeling for incidentals, and perfect carefulness in execution, with freedom and fidelity of 
treatment, love for what is evidently momentary and trifling, the freshness of open vision, and 
the undivided concentration of the whole soul on the tiniest and most limited things. […] And 
when it proceeds from the insignificant and the accidental to peasant life […], these scenes ap-
pear so completely penetrated by a naïve cheerfulness and jollity that the real subject-matter is 
[…] this cheerfulness and naïveté […]: it is the Sunday of life which equalizes everything and re-
moves all evil” (Hegel 1975: 886–887). According to Hegel, by depicting the everyday what Dutch 
paintings present us with is how the modern individual comes to feelingly identify with daily life, 
or to feel reconciled with the instrumentality and banality of daily life.
39 Hegel 1975:836.
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way of looking. The relevance of the attitude Wittgenstein thematizes is ethical 
and aesthetic. That a fragment of daily life, of something we take part in, appears 
to us uncanny when it is seen from a detached perspective and that, at the same 
time, it looks – as it happens with many XVII Dutch paintings – more wonderful 
than anything a playwright may want to be acted or spoken on a stage, tells us an 
important thing about the source of meaning and value. Wittgenstein points out 
that the everyday, is both a basic and a rich artistic and ethical category: it is the 
place were beauty and value accumulate, although we can only enjoy them when 
looking from the right perspective, i. e. by means of adopting the artistic way of 
looking at things.
It is because Wittgenstein considers art as a way of looking at things that 
confers meaning and value to them, that he connects it to ethics. In the Tagebü-
cher he writes:
Ist das Wesen der künstlerischen Betrachtungsweise, daß sie die Welt mit glücklichem Auge 
betrachtet?
To this question Wittgenstein answers with a quote from Schiller:
Ernst ist das Leben, heiter ist die Kunst. (TB 20.10.16)
The quote comes from the Prologue of Wallenstein, a drama set in the middle of 
the havoc, the robberies, the miseries of the Thirty Years’ War. It reminds us that 
the serenity of art is not to be found in what it presents, but that rather it resides 
“in how it is presented”.40 It is possible that by means of quoting Schiller, Wittgen-
stein may want to tell us something about the nature of the connection between 
art and ethics, namely that what is essential for art, that is, the perspective on 
things, is also essential for ethics, for the “enquiry into what is valuable, […] or 
into the meaning of life” (LE, 5). It seems that for Wittgenstein, value resides “in 
an attitude or style, in one’s acceptance of all the facts”,41 that there is a view, a 
way of feeling the world that amounts to an understanding of its sense.
Of course, this is a disputable idea; above all, there remains the crucial ques-
tion of what is the relationship between the serenity of art, or the experience of 
art, and the seriousness of life, the “prosaic” structure that life has outside the 
artistic domain. Wittgenstein says that the artistic way of looking at things con-
sists in looking at them with a happy eye, but he also maintains that the world of 
the happy is quite another world than that of the unhappy (cf. TLP 6.43), suggest-
40 Wilde 2004: 173.
41 Murdoch 1993: 28. Cf. also Majetschak 2000: 121–123.
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ing that that relationship between the two worlds is one of mutual exclusion and 
incomprehensibility. How, then, can the experience of art be related to the rest of 
our experience? As the distinction between art and everyday life cannot collapse, 
it is not easy to understand how these existential domains can be co-ordinated or 
can belong to the same totality.42
According to Wittgenstein, art can offer us moments of grace in which the 
beauty and significance of the world, that is, of life, is revealed. However, more 
than of a form of integration he seems to be thinking of a sort of gestaltic change, 
by which the world changes its form, it becomes a happy world, although the 
facts are the same. This attitude – the attitude that, in Wittgenstein’s conception, 
art exemplifies – is one with seeing the world, that is, life, with wonder, like a 
miracle and not like a mere accident. As a response to the world, wonder is a sort 
of affective grasping of the non accidentality of the being of what there is, a way 
of feeling this non accidentality. Therefore, it is a way of experiencing value and 
sense.
A similar thought appears in other texts from the same period from which 
it results that for Wittgenstein, wonder does not arise from the perception of a 
problem, and therefore it is not something that an explanation can eradicate (cf. 
WWK, 68). We do not wonder because there is something we cannot explain, but 
we wonder because we look at something in a certain way.43 However, suffering 
from a sort of “blindness to wonder” or “blindness to miracle”, many of us are 
inclined to think that a miracle is simply a fact that science has not yet explained. 
Wittgenstein argues that “the scientific way of looking at a fact is not the way to 
42 Cf. Gardner 2002: 295–296. This problem was clear to Hegel. By depicting the everyday, Dutch 
painting suggests a feelingly identification with daily life. However, what follows the “Sunday of 
life” are working days with their instrumental character and banality, and for Hegel romantic art 
is not able to integrate these two antagonistic domains of existence.
43 Incidentally, it is interesting to observe that this idea also seems to operate in Wittgenstein’s 
criticism to Frazer’s work on primitive rituals – a criticism that occupies many among the re-
marks collected in the Kringel-Buch. As already observed, Wittgenstein’s criticism is not merely 
methodological. When discussing Frazer’s explanation of primitive rituals, Wittgenstein some-
times suggests that any phenomenon can look mysterious and significant, and not because of 
our ignorance of its cause (cf. KB #134–135). He rejects the explanation of primitive amazement as 
a result of ignorance, calling it the “dummen Aberglaube unserer Zeit”, and he seems to assume 
that looking at something from a perspective that confers meaning to it is a distinctive feature 
of humanity. According to him, primitive rituals are based on an instinct, which is pervasive of 
human behaviour, a disposition to react in a certain way towards “significant phenomena”. This 
persuasion is the reason why Wittgenstein thinks that Frazer misunderstands the nature of the 
phenomena he seeks to explain and wrongly assimilates the understanding of rituals to the solu-
tion of a scientific problem.
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look at it as a miracle” (LE, 10-11). Sure, facts are not miraculous as such, since 
they are not particularly significant as such. However, as Ronald Hall points out, 
“blindness to wonder” is a form of “blindness to reality”.44 It is a blindness to that 
aspect of reality – call it significance or value – that art, by compelling us to the 
right perspective, makes us able to see. This is also the idea that lies at the heart 
of KB #52. We can summarize it by saying that the everyday can be surprising and 
wonderful only if seen under the right perspective.45 
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